Cast thy burden upon the Lord,

And he shall sustain thee.

—Julius Schubring, “Cast Thy Burden upon the Lord”

Behind the military successes described in the previous chapter were some serious problems for the American troops. For the defenders on Bataan, tropical diseases and poor nutrition—not the Japanese—were now the immediate threats.[1] For its size, Bataan was the most malaria-infested place in the world, and the rate of malaria and other diseases climbed as limited supplies of medicine were exhausted.[2]

Food likewise became a serious problem. Rice fields, abandoned by the native Filipinos at the beginning of the war, were taken over by the troops and combed for anything edible. By February 1942, rations were limited to one-half pound of rice per man per day. This was a time when the army was still using horses and pack mules, which were now being slaughtered and eaten by the starving soldiers. Hunting for monkeys, iguanas, and carabao became a necessity rather than a sport, although Hamblin and many others could never bring themselves to eat a monkey. After being skinned, they resembled a newborn baby and, to Hamblin and others, weren’t all that appetizing. In a short time, these edible animals became scarce, and snake hunting was the next thing to become popular.[3] Notwithstanding resourcefulness and survival skills, the defenders on Bataan were sick and starving. Now was the time for rescue.

George Brown, Lieutenant Bobby Brown’s father, pleaded for help in a February 15, 1942, letter to Congressman R. E. Thomason:

We have not heard of any effort or influence on your part to have some relief sent to the Philippines Islands [other Congressmen had been publicly calling on the Roosevelt Administration to do something in that regard]. No doubt you are doing all you can, but may I remind you that there are a number of people in this district who are full of anxiety over the Filipino situation.

You know how we westerners feel about a buddy in a jam. Our policy is to get him out or die in the attempt. Anyhow, I don’t believe that those American boys should be left to their doom, and I don’t suppose they will be.[4]

It is probably just as well that George did not know that leaving “those American boys . . . to their doom” was exactly what the Roosevelt administration planned to do. The cold, hard truth was that there would be no new supplies, no reinforcements, and no rescue. This time, the cavalry was not coming.

With the outbreak of war in Europe, War Plan Orange was scrapped and replaced with plans known as “Rainbow” to deal with a worldwide war involving multiple enemies. Working with the British, US war planners secretly developed a strategy to confront Germany first, as Germany was considered the greater threat. Europe was to receive priority in terms of resources. Thus, those on Bataan would receive no reinforcements.[5]

A convoy of ships with badly needed supplies and reinforcements already en route to the Philippines was redirected and then recalled by Washington—actions that led to heated debates within the War Department and between navy and army commanders[6]

Everyone wanted to rescue the troops in the Philippines. No one wanted to abandon them. But the cruel fact was that the program to make the Philippines an “impregnable fortress” had not proceeded far enough for the soldiers in the Philippines to be able to defend themselves without assistance, and the United States had made no contingency plans or preparations to provide that assistance. With the Japanese having complete air and naval supremacy in the Philippines, no such rescue attempt was likely to succeed.[7]

The press and, as George Brown had alluded to in his letter, some members of Congress were critical of President Roosevelt and the War Department for failing to aid General MacArthur and the troops on Bataan. But they were at odds with the master strategy for winning the war, and the criticisms were ignored. By late December 1941, President Roosevelt had “regrettably written off” the Philippines.[8]

Nevertheless, relying on misleading messages from President Roosevelt and others in Washington, General MacArthur assured his troops that help was on the way and that thousands of troops and hundreds of planes were being dispatched.[9] While General MacArthur received messages informing him relief shipments were being dispatched, he was not told the convoys were intended for strategic destinations other than the Philippines. President Roosevelt insisted the navy was “following an intensive and well-planned campaign which will result in positive assistance to the defense of the Philippine Islands,” but there was no such campaign and there never was a serious plan to rescue them. Henry Stimson, the secretary of war, coldly wrote in his diary with respect to those fighting on Bataan, “there are times when men have to die.”[10] Although he hid it from the lower levels of his command and his troops, General MacArthur understood the truth that there would be no help.[11]

The troops on Bataan, believing implicitly that help was on the way, fought with surprising effectiveness while awaiting their expected rescue. The 515th at the Cabcaben airfield and the 200th at the Bataan airfield battled daily not only to protect what was left of their air force, but also to keep the airfields open for hoped-for U.S. planes with supplies and reinforcements from Australia.[12] At the Cabcaben airfield, the soldiers constructed revetments, largely using picks and shovels, to protect the hoped-for arrival of B-17s from Australia.[13]

After a while, the troops wondered about the promised reinforcements. They thought America seemed apathetic. Although the troops never really gave up, morale plummeted as they felt abandoned. In addition to President Roosevelt and Secretary Stimson, the troops began to resent General MacArthur.[14] Views were mixed among the Latter-day Saint soldiers. Rex Bray and Gene Jacobsen detested General MacArthur, while Orland Hamblin considered him a great general and American.[15]

Despite plunging morale, American soldiers maintained a resilient sense of humor. When a baby was born at a field hospital, one soldier quipped that “if FDR won’t send reinforcements, we’ll make our own.” Some soldiers attempted to raise a fund to buy a bomber from their own government—the “Bomber for Bataan Fund.” A journalist penned the following doggerel that became the theme of the abandoned defenders of Bataan:

We’re the Battling Bastards of Bataan

No Mama, No Papa, No Uncle Sam,

No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces.

No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces

And nobody gives a damn.[16]

Notes

[1] Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 367, 384.

[2] Shively, Profiles in Survival, 38; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 377–79.

[3] Hamblin, “My Experience,” 5; Jacobsen, We Refused to Die, 65–66; Mellnik, “The Life and Death”; Cave, Beyond Courage, 125.

[4] George A. Brown to Honorable R. E. Thomason, February 15, 1942, NARA Records.

[5] Shively, Profiles in Survival, 11–12; Burton, Fortnight of Infamy, 39–40. While the original Rainbow plan assumed the abandonment of the Philippines, General MacArthur was able to persuade the War Department to expand the role of his Far East command and, in view of the existing forces and planned reinforcements (the aircraft in particular), to change the Rainbow plan to include a defense of the Philippines. However, such defense would be conducted entirely by the forces on the Philippines, as the revised plan—similar to the previous War Plan Orange—did not provide for any reinforcements to the Philippines. Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 65.

[6] Shively, Profiles in Survival, 22–23; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 145–48.

[7] Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 152. There were later some efforts to supply the Philippines with additional food and medicine by submarines, but those failed to provide such aid in any significant quantities. Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 391–404.

[8] Sides, Ghost Soldiers, 43; Lukacs, Escape from Davao, 34.

[9] Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 387.

[10] Sides, Ghost Soldiers, 43, Lukacs, Escape from Davao, 32–33.

[11] Burton, Fortnight of Infamy, 199–200; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 242.

[12] Shively, Profiles in Survival, 206. At Bataan, Hamlin was assigned the task of keeping telephone lines open through the repeated bombings of their positions by the Japanese; “My Experience,” 5.

[13] Garner, Unwavering Valor, 54–55.

[14] Morton, Fall of the Philippines, 387–89; see Hamblin, “My Experience,” 5; Lukacs, Escape from Davao, 37–38.

[15] Jacobsen, We Refused to Die, 24, 73–74; Kurtis R. Bray, email message to author, February 22, 2017; Hamblin, “My Experience,” 6.

[16] Lukacs, Escape from Davao, 37–38.